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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
No.

8994

SPANISH FoRK WEsT FIELD IRRIGATION CoMPANY, A CoRPORATION, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND RESPONDENTS

v.
THE UNITED STATES, A NATION, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND
APPELLANTS

APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY

BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS, THE UNITED ST~TES, THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, AND THE COMMISSIONER OF
RECLAMATION
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Strawberry Valley Irrigation Project is a rec:lamation
project of the United States, built and operated under and in
pursuance of the Reclamation Act of 1902 (32: Stat. 388) and
acts supplemental thereto. Construction of the project by the
United States began in about the year 1907 (Fdg. 22) and
irrigation water was first declared to be available under the
project by public notice dated October 8, 1915 (Def. Ex. 50).
The project serves lands in the southerly part of Utah County,
Utah. Its principal features include the Strawberry Valley
Reservoir, located in Wasatch County, Utah, and the High
Line and Springville-Mapleton Canals.
Most of the project water supply is obtained by trans-mountain diversion from the Colorado River system and the water
so obtained is stored in the Strawberry Valley Reservoir (Fdgs.
22, 51). Released from there as need arises during the irrigation season, this water pours through a tunnel in the Wasatch
(1)
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Mountains and into the Diamond Fork of the Spanish Fork
River. From that river, it is diverted at several points for the
ultimate use by irrigators and other water users who have contracted with the United States for the delivery of water. In
furtherance of the project plan, the United States filed upon
and acquired the right to use the waters so stored in the Strawberry Valley Reservoir (Fdg. 22).
By applications filed in 1909 and 1914, the United States also
acquired under the law of Utah appropriative rights to use
for irrigation of lands within the project 390 cubic feet per
second of the natural flow of Spanish Fork River (Fdgs. 22, 24,
25). Water available under these rights comprises the second
component of the project supply. 1
Insofar as this case is concerned, the project includes two
types of water users. The plaintiff type are the users under
appropriative rights to use natural flow of the Spanish Fork
River which were acquired independently of the appropriations
made by the United States. Consequently, these users irrigate
with "river" water obtained under those rights during the
spring months when such water is available, and their only
demand upon the project water supply is for stored water after
the early river flow has subsided. Their lands are served with
both "river" water and stored water through the works of the
plaintiff canal and irrigation companies and some of the defendant companies similarly situated which did not join as
plaintiffs. 2
The United States also has a right under an appropriation of 1906 to
use 156 cubic feet per second of the :flow of Spanish Fork River for power
purposes ( Fdg. 23). It is deemed unnecessary further to consider that
right for the purposes of this appeal.
~The trial court determined that the appropriative rights of all these
companies in the natural :flow of the Spanish Fork River, aggregating 390
cubic feet per second, are prior in time to the appropriatiw rights of the
United States from the same source (Decree. pars. 5-9). ·whether or not
that is correct is not a matter of moment in the consideration of this
appeal as, in our view, the decree must be set aside for lack of jurisdiction
in the Court below rto render it. It iJS sufficient to obserw here that no
complaint is made in the petition that the appropriati>e rights of those companiP~ have been injured by anyone, including the United States, and the
petition does not seek a declarartion of the relative priorities of the companies and the United States. That is not what this case is about, as
appears more particularly below.
1
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3
The defendant-type users receive their entire water requirements from the project supply, the deliveries to them consisting of "river" water within the United States' appropriations so
long as it is available, and thereafter of stored water. All of
the lands belonging to users of this type are under the High
·Line and Springville-Mapleton Canals.
"Most" of the water right application contracts between the
United States and the defendant-type users provide for delivery
of that quantity of project water which shall be beneficially
used on the lands referred to in the applications, not to exceed
a specified number of acre feet per acre (Fdg. 30). A typical
provision of those contracts is quoted in Finding 30 as follows:
The quantitive measure of the water right hereby applied for is that quantity of water which shall be beneficially used for the irrigation of said irrigable land up to,
but not exceeding two (2) acre feet per acre per annum,
measured at the head of the Strawberry High Line Ca;.
nal, and in no case exceeding the share proportionate to
irrigable acreage, of the water supply actually available
as determined by the Project Manager or other proper
officer of the United States, or its successor in the control of the project, during the irrigation season for the
irrigation of lands under said unit. The applicant assumes all risk of loss in transporting the water from the
point of delivery to the said land.
Although in the course of development of the project at least
nine different forms of water-right applieations were used, including the contracts with the plaintiff-type users, the trial
court found that as to every such contract for project water, it
was intended that in case the total supply of water available in
any year should be insufficient "to fully supply all applicants,
then the supply available should be prorated in proportion to
the acre feet subscribed for by the holders of applications approved and then in good standing" (Fdg. 45). "The majority"
of such contracts "specify a. period of delivery of water from
May 1st to September 30th, while some specify the irrigation
season, and others contain no recital as to the time of delivery"
(Fdg. 45).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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4
The defendant Strawberry Water Users' Association was
incorporated in 1922 (Fdg. 33) for the purpose of operating
the project (Plf. Ex. 13). Pursuant to request by the Association of the Secretary of the Interior, the United States, acting
by and through the Secretary, and in pursuance of subsection
G of Section 4 of the Act of December 5, 1924 (43 Stat. 702),
entered into a contract on September 28, 1926, whereby "the
care, operation and maintenance of the entire" project "except
the Mapleton and Springville lateral [canal] and the High
Line Canal" were transferred to the Association.3 The transfer
was made "subject to the terms of all existing contracts" and
the contract provided for retention of title to all property in
the Government (Plf. Ex. 11, Article 11; Fdg. 33). The Association obligated itself to operate the project "in full compliance with the reclamation law as it now exists (and as it may
hereafter be amended), the regulations of the Secretary now
and hereafter made thereunder, and the terms of this contract. * * *" These terms still govern management of the
project by the Association (Def. Ex. 49, Articles 14, 23; Fdg.
33), although the original contract was amended by later contracts dated November 20, 1928 (Def. Ex. 48) and October 9,
1940 (Def. Ex. 49; Fdg. 33).
For many years it has been the practice of the Association
to provide that use by the defendant-type users of early "river"
water should be charged only in part against their respective
contract entitlements (Fdg. 43). A reason for this practice
has been that, because stored water delivered after the early
river flow has subsided is n1ore valuable to the irrigators (Fdg.
48), the defendant-type users would not use all the "river"
water when it is available if such water were fully charged to
their contract entitle1nents and a portion of the "river" water
would as a result be lost to the project (Fdg. 49).
It is this practice in a.d1ninistration of the project water supply which is the sole subject of controversy in this suit. The
plaintiff-type users being so situated as not to receive any apparent direct benefits therefr01n, this suit was initiated under
11

The car(', operation and maintenance of the High Line and Sprineo-villeMapleton Canals had been previously transferred to other organizations
(Fdgs. 32, 34-, 35; Plf. Exs.lO and 15).
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the Utah Declaratory Judgment Act late in December, '1'954.
The plaintiffs purport to represent all plaintiff-type users and
they sue the defendants as representatives of all defendant-type
users. The relief prayed for, so far as it need be considered for
the purposes of this appeal, was a determination ( 1) that all
water right applicants under the project should be charged in
full with all the water they receive, whether "river" water or
stored water, and (2) that all parties should be limited to the
quantities of water specified in their respective contracts with
the United States, except as they may show some other or additional water right. The injury which plaintiffs assert is that
the practice complained of diminishes the supply of stored
water beyond the extent to which it would be diminished if the
defendant-type water users were charged in full for their use
of river water, thereby requiring plaintiff-type users to accept
pro rata reductions of their contract entitlements in years
when water in storage is insufficient to meet all project needs.
Motions to dismiss and to quash service of process were filed
on behalf of the United States, the Secretary of the Interior
and the Commissioner of Recla1na tion. These motions were
denied and thereafter a petition for an interlocutory appeal was
denied by this Court on October 3, 1955. Defendants, the
United States, the Secretary of the Interior and the Commis.sioner of Reclamation, "without submitting to the jurisdiction"
of the Court below, then answered. Trial of the cause was had
during January, 1957, and the Court below entered its findings
of fact, conclusions of law, and decree on March 12, 1958. Motion for a new trial made by the United States, the Secretary of
the Interior and the Commissioner of Recla1nation, in which
motion certain of the other defendants joined, was denied on
November 22, 1958. Notice of appeal to this Court from the
judgment of the trial court and from the order denying the motion for new trial were timely filed by the United States, the
Secretary of the Interior, and the Commissioner of Reclamation. All other parties have likewise appealed.
In its determination of the case, the trial court went far beyond plaintiffs' request for a determination that all water used
should be charged to the respective contract entitlements and
that all users should be limited to their respective contract
5.06.8.5.6---5.9-2
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rights except as they might show some other or additional right.
After gratuitously determining, aliunde the pleadings, that the
rights of the United States in the natural flow of the Spanish
Fork River are junior to such rights of Spanish Fork City and
the canal and irrigation companies which carry project water to
the plaintiff-type users, and enjoining "the United States, its
agents and successors in title and interest" from interfering
with the latter rights (Decree, par. 11), the decree then quiets
"in the United States and its successors in interest and title"
title to the appropriate rights of the United States "to the flow
of the Spanish Fork River to the extent of 390 cubic feet per
second during the period extending from March 1st to N ovember 1st of each year" and to the "rights to the use of the water
stored and to be stored in the Strawberry Reservoir" (Decree,
par. 12). The Court then, having concluded that the Water
Users' Association "in its management and operation of the
Strawberry Project, does not have the right to allow diversion
of water from the river without charging the user therefor"
(Conclusion 14) but that the charge to be made need not and
should not be for the full quantity of river water used (Conclusions 15 and 16), assumed to itself the power to determine the
proper percentages of charge which should be made on account
of such uses. Paragraph 13 of the Decree sets forth the trial
court's judgment of the percentages of charge properly to be
made under the circumstances therein set forth. By paragraph
14 of the Decree the State Engineer of Utah is designated as
the court's agent to estimate each year the project water supply,
as a predicate for application of the appropriate percentage
charge prescribed by the preceding paragraph. Paragraph 15
purports to authorize the \Vater Users' Association to sell excess river water in years of high water. but prescribes that "no
sale shall be 1nade for use upon lands covered by presently subsisting subscriptions in the Strawberry reclamation project at
a cost less than that which ,yjll be connnensurate with the percentage charges hereinabove set forth for use of project river
water." And by paragra.ph 16 jurisdiction is retained for a
period of ten years for the purpooe "of making changes in the
percentages of charges to be n1ade for the use of project river
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water in the event the percentages herein provided for shall be
found to be inequitable."
STATEMENT OF POINTS

I. The Court below had no jurisdiction over the United
States and could acquire none. As the United States was an
indispensable party, however, the entire action should have
been dismissed.
II. The Court below had no jurisdiction over the Secretary
of the Interior and could acquire none. As the Secretary was,
however, an indispensable party, the entire action should have
been dismissed.
III. The decree entered is invalid for the following additional
reasons. It should be set aside and the Court below directed to
dismiss the action.
(a) The Court below has promulgated a legislative regulation for future guidance. This is foreign to the judicial function
and is forbidden by the doctrine of separation of powers, which
is binding as well upon the courts of Utah as upon the federal
courts.
(b) The decree of the Court below directs the operation of
a federal reclamation project. But the power of Congress over
the operation of federal reclamation projects derives from the
federal Constitution and is exclusive of all State authority.
Congress has not authorized the States or the courts of the
States to direct in any particular the operation of these projects.
(c) The decree of the Court below substitutes the will of the
Court for the will of the Secretary of the Interior, who is
charged by law with responsibility for the operation of federal reclamation projects. The doctrine of separation of powers
which precludes the court from promulgating, a legislative regulation in the first place, also precludes it from assuming direction of the executive function.
(d) The decree of the Court below makes new contracts for
the parties. No court has power to do this.
IV. Plaintiffs failed to establish a cause of action against defendants and even though jurisdiction of the United States
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and the Secretary of the Interior were assumed the trial court
should have entered judgment dismissing the complaint.
ARGUMENT

It is important to note that this case is not a contest between appropriators .and it was not brought to determine
priorities. It is a contest between rival camps of water users
under a reclamation project of the United States respecting
administration of the project water supply, the right to the
use of which has been appropriated by the United States under
Utah law. Such interests as .all these water users have in that
supply derive solely from contracts with the United States.
These contracts are creatures of federal reclamation law, to
be determined by that law and not by the law of Utah.
This is an action, purely and simply, for a declaratory judgment. The only relief really sought by the petition is a declaration that all parties be limited "to the amount of water provided in their respective contracts with the United States." 4
So stated, it is apparent that plaintiffs have misconceived their
forum because, as this Court knows, the United States can be
sued on its contracts for monetary relief only in the federal
courts (28 U.S.C. § 1346, 1491), and in no court for specific
relief. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 703
(1949). It is to be noted the United States is the other party
to every contract to which the attention of the Court below was
solicited by the petition. But, '"ere it not for the impediments
hereinafter discussed to obtaining the relief sought against the
United States and the Secretary of the Interior, plaintiffs did
not 1nisconceive their appropriate re1nedy, if they have a cause
of action against anyone (which we deny), because declaratory
relief is n1ost proper where the construction of "Titten instru4
Second pra~·er of the petition. The first prayer of the petition actually
only supplem~c'nts the ~0eond. It requests that nll water users "be charged
with all of the water that they receiYe''--something quite meaningless unless
1h<>Y :1 re limited to their contrn dun 1 entitlements. The third and fourth
JH·ayPrs of the pPtition do not enlarge the contractual basis of this suit and
in any event have been ~tricken by agreement of the parties. The fifth
prayer is for "an nppropriate decree to insure a compliance with its determination." The ~ixth prnyN· is for relief pendente lite and the seventh is for
such further order as is just and proper.
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ments or contracts, wills, deeds, etc., will resolve the controversy. Unresponsive to the plaintiffs' petition, however, the
Court below entered a decree which, it is submitted, will not
withstand analysis. The question put to the Court by plaintiffs was: "Can the defendants, under their contracts with the
United States, use river water without a full charge being made
therefor?" Answering that question in the affirmative, the
Court then proceeded to determine: "How much of a charge
should be made for the use of such water?" When the Court
attempted in its decree to answer that ques:tion, it passed by the
pales of the judicial function and entered the legislative province of rate making. This it could not constitutionally do.
The second prayer of the petition shows that the suit is not
one for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river
system or other source, 5 but only one for determination of contractual entitlement of the defendant-type water users to share
in the rights of one appropriator-the United States. It is obvious that the questions presented by the petition could not be
answered until the Court interpreted the provisions of all contracts executed between the United States and water users of
the defendant type. (Supra, footnote 4.) Yet the Court below made no real interpretation of the contracts. It found that
there were hundreds of them (Fdg. 16); that there were nine
different types of them (Fdg. 45); and that the period of delivery of water under some was from May 1st to November 1st of
each year and under others was unspecified (Fdg. 45). "Most"
of the individual defendants' contracts for delivery of water
through the Strawberry High Line Canal failed to specify the
period during which water would be delivered, if the contractual provision reproduced in Finding 30 is typical. To note that
is to wrestle with the problem of interpretation but not to solve
it.
The evidence shows that 138 contracts were executed with individuals of the defendant type (Tr. 42) containing the following common provision:
2. The quantitive measure of the water right hereby
applied for is that quantity of water which shall be
5

This contention is addressed in Part I of this argument, infra.
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beneficially used for the irrigation of said irrigable lands
up to, but not exceeding, two (2) acre-feet per acre per
annum, measured at the head of the High Line Canal;
and in no case exceeding the share, proportionate to
irrigable acreage, of the w.ater supply actually available
as determined by the Project Manager or other proper
officer of the United States, or of its successors in the
control of the project, during the irrigation season for
the irrigation of lands under said unit. The said water
shall be delivered at the head of the High Line Canal
during the irrigation season from May 1 to October 1 of
each year in a flow as nearly uniform as practicable, unless otherwise mutually agreed, and will be distributed
throughout the months of the irrigation season in accordance with the schedule of delivery adopted by the
Secretary of the Interior for the High Line l~ nit. The
applicant .assumes all risk of loss in transporting the
water from the point of delivery to the said lands.
[Emphasis supplied.] (Def. Ex. 18.)
The Court below found that the season of "high water" in the
Spanish Fork River "usually occurs between about April 1
and May 20, and usually lasts not more than two or three
weeks" (Fdg. 4 7). Suppose that any part of the high-water
flow occurs before May 1 or the extreme case where it all
occurs before May 1. Isn't it true that, in the case of a water
user whose contract contains the provision quoted above, the
limit of two acre-feet per acre per annum does not apply with
respect to river water delivered before May 1? Isn't this even
more persuasive when we consider the following provision from
the contract which the United States executed "-ith the Strawberry High Line Canal Company?
The water for the High Line lTnit will be delivered at
the head of the High Line Canal which is located in
the southeast quarter of section 33, TownshiJ) 8 South,
Range 3 East during the irrigation season of May 1 to
October 1 of eaeh year in accordance with the terms of
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the existing contracts and public notices and future
contracts and public notices. * * *. [Emphasis sup,..
plied.] (Plf. Ex. 12.) 6
And isn't it clear beyond question that under the quoted contract provision the ultimate determination of the quantity of
water actually to be delivered is to be made by the authorized
officer or .agent of the United States operating the project on
the basis of his estimate (and not the estimate of the Court
or Utah State Engineer) of the water supply actually available
"for the irrigation of lands under said unit"?
In any event, plaintiffs' petition necessarily sought a declaration that would fairly interpret every contract held by individual water users of the defendant type. If that was the steep
:and thorny way to ultimate solution, it might at least have resulted in a decree on its face within the power of the Court to
render, subject to the questions hereinafter discussed respecting
'SUability of the United States and the Secretary of the Interior
and the capacity of the Courts to control the executive branch
of the United States government, rather than in the legislative
rule which the Court adopted quite unsolicited by any of the
parties.
8
And see the public notice published May 21, 1917, by the Secretary of
the Interior, paragraph 14 of which reads as follows:
"14. Schedule of water delivery for High Line Unit.-During the irriga,.
tion season of 1917 and thereafter, until further notice, water will be
,delivered to all lands of the High Line Unit, Strawberry Valley Project,
Utah, under Public Notice in accordance with the following schedule: In
May, 18% of the total amount called for by the water-right application, in
·as near a uniform flow as practicable. The remainder of the season's
supply to be delivered as demanded, but not to exceed 27lh% of the total
amount in any one month, in as near a uniform flow as practicable, during
the remainder of the irrigation season, which is from May 1 to September
30." [Emphasis supplied.] (Def. Ex. 54.)

Other public notices subsequently issued, as those of March 11, 1919 (Def.
Ex. 58), February 20, 1920 (Def. Ex. 59), April 26, 1920 (Def. Ex. 61),
February 15, 1921 (Def. Ex. 62), fail to define the period of delivery
..otherwise.
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L The Court below had no jurisdiction over the United States
~nd could acquire none. As the United States was an indispensable party, however, the entire action should have been
dismissed
(a) Section 666, 43 U.S.C., enacted as a rider to the Department of Justice
ltp'ptopriation Act, 1953, was intended to and does authorize the joinder
of the United States as a defendant only in suits which are sui generis,
relating to the general adjudication of rights to the use of water of a
river system or other source

In In Re Bear River Drainage Area, 2 Utah 2d. 208,271 P. 2d
846 (1954), this Court said "It is elemental that the Federal
government cannot be sued without its consent and it has been
held that there is no distinction between suits against the government directly and suits against its property''/ and "The
waiver of sovereign immunity is the sole prerogative of Congress." To the same effect see: United States v. Sherwood, 312
U.S. 584, 586 (1941); United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495,500
(1940); Minnesota v. United States, supra, footnote 7; Arizooo
v. California, 298 U.S. 558, 568 (1935).
The first question, then, presented by this appeal is: Did the
Court below have jurisdiction over the United States?
The fact that this is a suit for declaratory judgment does
not confer jurisdiction upon the Court. The federal Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202, does not in itself authorize suit against the United States (a fortiori, the
Utah statute does not), but provides an additional remedy
only where the jurisdiction of the federal court has already
attached by virtue of some other statute. See Aetna Casualty
and Surety Co. v. Quarles (C.A. 4, 1937) 92 F. 2d 321, wherein
the Court said: "The Declaratory Judgments Act does not add
to a Court's jurisdiction, but it is a procedural statute providing for an additional remedy for use in cases of ·which the Federal courts already had jurisdiction. In a suit for relief under
the Declaratory Judgments Act, the question is not whether
jurisdiction shall be assu1ned but whether in exercising jurisdiction already conferred, a discretion exists with respect to
granting· the rPnwdy prayed for." Particularly pertinent is
7
"A prO('PPding- ng-ninst property in whkh the Fnited States has an interest is a suit againHt the Unitl'd States", llfiuncsota v. United States, 305 U.S.
382, 386 ( 1938) .
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the following language of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit in Brownell v. Ketcham Wire and Manufacturing Co., 211 F. 2d 121 (1954): "The Declaratory Judgments Act does not constitute a consent of the United States
to be sued but merely grants an aJdditional remedy in eases
where jurisdiction already exists in the Court."
Plaintiffs will say (in fact will be obliged to say) that jurisdiction is authorized by 43 U.S.C. § 666. But that statute
does not grant that consent without which this suit must faiL
Subdivision (a) of§ 666, 43 U.S.C., enacted as a rider to the:
Department of Justice Appropriation Act of 1953, reads as;
follows:
Consent is hereby given to join the United States as:
a defendant in any suit ( 1) for the adjudication of
rights to the use of water of a river system or other
source, or (2) for the administration of such rights,
where it appears that the United States is the owner
of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange,
or otherwise, and the United States is a necessary party
to such suit. The United States, when a party to any
such suit, shall ( 1) be deemed to have waived any
right to plead that the State laws are inapplicable or
that the United States is not amenable thereto by reason of its sovereignty, and (2) shall be subject to thejudgments, orders, and decrees of the court having jurisdiction, and may obtain review thereof, in the samemanner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances: Provided, That no judgment
for costs shall be entered against the United States in
any such suit.
But this is not a suit for the adjudication or administration
of rights to the use of water of a river system or other source.
It is a suit for a declaratory judgment. The petition, which is
so styled, recites that the action "is brought pursuant to the·
Declaratory Judgment Act of Utah, the same being Chapter 33
of Title 78, U.C.A., 1958." Compare the general determination
law of Utah, Chapter 4 of Title 73., U.C.A., 1953. The follow-1

5.0635.6--59-3
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ing considerations show that the federal statute was enacted
to permit joinder of the United States only in suits for the
general adjudication of water rights, not at all in suits such as
this under the declaratory judgment acts.
Suits for the general adjudication of water rights are, as this
Court knows, actions sui generis, Weil, Water Rights in the
Western States, 3d ed., vol. 2, page 1125; Holbrook Irrigation
District v. Fort Lyon Canal Co., 84 Colo. 174, 195, 269 Pac.
.574, 582; Hough v. Porter, 51 Or. 318, 439, 98 Pac. 1083, 1109,
,common in the law of the Western States in one form or
:another, Weil, supra, pages 1120, 1125. There is a universal
requirement in such suits that all known claimants to the
water supply be joined and that their individual rights be
determined by the final decree. The reason for this is pointed
out by the court's opinion in Washington State Sugar Co. v.
Sheppard (C.C., D. Idaho, N.D. 1911) 186 Fed. 233, 235:

* * * it is highly important that all claimants to the
right to divert the water of a natural stream for beneficial purposes should be brought into the same court
in a single action, and therein be required to wage their
claims, in order that such claims, necessarily more or
less interdependent and conditioned one upon the other,
may be settled and defined by a single decree. The
cogency of the reasons for such course is so thoroughly
appreciated that almost invariably the state courts in
the arid region, where the doctrine of appropriation
prevails, have shown solicitude and have exercised great
care in requiring that all claimants be made parties in
suits of this character.
The nature of such suits is put this way in this Court's
opinion in Bear River, supra, p. 12:
The purpose of the statutory procedure for the determination of water rights is to prevent piecemeal litigation or a multiplicity of suits and to provide a means
of determining all rights in one action. * * * A general
determination * * * differs from the ordinary private
suit in that it is a statutory procedure which n1ay be
commenced by the state engineer for the purpose of
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bringing into the suit every water claimant or user on
a single source or system and require them to litigate
and settle their relative rights in one proceeding.
And in this way by the Supreme Court of the United States,
construing the Oregon statute which is the counterpart of the
Utah general determination law:

* * *, the proceeding in question is a quasi public
proceeding, set in motion by a public agency of the
State. All claimants are required to appear and prove
their claims; no one can refuse without forfeiting his
claim, and all have the same relation to the proceeding.
It is intended to be universal and to result in a complete
ascertainment of all existing rights, to the end; First,
that the waters may be distributed, under public supervision, among the lawful claimants according to their
respective rights without needless waste or controversy;
Second, that the rights of all may be evidenced by
appropriate certificates and public records, always readily accessible, and may not be dependent upon the testimony of witnesses with its recognized infirmities and
uncertainties, and, Third, that the amount of surp1us
or unclaimed water, if any, may be ascertained and
rendered available to intending appropriators.
*
*
*
*
*
* * * In such a proceeding the rights of the several
claimants are so closely related that the presence of all
is essential to the accomplishment of its purpose, and
it hardly needs statement that these cannot be attained
by mere private suits in which only a few of the claimants are present, for only their rights as between themselves could be determined * * *. Pacific Live Stock
Co. v. Oregon Water Board, 241 U.S. 440, 447 (1916)
et seq.
That the universal requirement of joinder of all known
claimants is not limited to statutory adjudication suits appears
further from a recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. There the Court said:
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The only proper method of adjudicating the rights
on a stream, whether riparian or appropriative or mixed,.
is to. have all owners of land on the watershed and all
appropriators who use water from the stream involved
in another watershed in court at the same time.
The trial court violated this principle hy issuing a
declaratory judgment as to th-e right of the United
States as against one claimant whose rights were junior,
which had the effect of preventing a trial of the other·
water rights involved without giving a hearing as to the
individual owners. 8
Thus it is apparent that a suit to which something less than
the whole number of known claimants of rights to use the
waters of the river system or other source sought to be adjudicated are joined is not an adjudication suit within the generally
accepted meaning of that term, and that this is not such a suit.
It is further apparent that this is not a suit of the type consented to by 43 U.S.C. § 666. The legislative history of that
statute shows that the Congress intended nothing different
from what the language of the statute clearly expresses and
that consent to the joinder of the United States in general
adjudication suits only is granted. The then Chairman of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary stated that the act
is not in tended to be used for any other purpose than to
allow the United States to be joined in a suit wherein
it is necessary to adjudicate all of the rights of various owners on a given strerun. This is so because unless
all of the parties owning or in the process of acquiring
water rights on a particular strerun Call be joined as
parties defendant, any subsequent decree would be of
little value. 9
But in demonstrating the inapplicability here of Section 666
we are not restricted to the language of the st.a.tute and to the
8
State of Oalifornia et al., v. The United States of Amf"rica. (C. A. 9,
1956), 235 F. 2d 647,663.
0
Report No. 755, 82d Cong., 1st St=>ss .. pngt=> 9. See Appendix hereto. In

the npp<>mlix 11wn~ nre set forth additional excerpts from the Report which
show that only general adjudication suUs were contemplated by the language of the statute in question.
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legislative history as disclosed by Senate Report No. 755.
Miller v. Jennings (C.A. 5, 1957), 243, F. 2'd 15-7, was a suit for
declaratory and injunctive relief quite similar to this. It was
brought by several water users and the water district of which
they were constituents, purporting to represent all other users
similarly situated, for a declaration of their asserted rights
under a contract with the United States providing for the
delivery of project water surplus to the needs of the Rio Grande
Federal Reclamation Project. There, as here, the named defendants were the United States, officers of the Department
of the Interior, and certain project landowners who were allegedly sued as representatives of all other landowners similarly
situated. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in affirming dismissal of the case, denied plaintiffs' claim of the applicability
of Section 666 in the following language:
The United States has not given its consent to be
joined as a defendant in every suit involving water
rights. It may be made a party only in suits 'for the
adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river
system or other source.' There can be an adjudication
of rights with respect to the upper Rio Grande only in
a proceeding where all persons who have rights are before the tribunal. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
has most succinctly stated the doctrine in this manner:
"The only proper method of adjudicating the rights
on a stream, whether riparian or appropriative or
mixed, is to have all owners of lands on the watershed
and all appropriators who use water from the streams
involved in another watershed in court at the same
time." People of the State of California v. United
States, 9 Cir., 1956, 235 F. 2d 647, 633. See Pacific
Live Stock Co. v. Lewis, 241 U.S. 440, 36 S. Ct. 637, 60
L.Ed.1084.
With respect to plaintiffs' contention that the suit was maintainable as a class action, the Court said:
It is urged by the plaintiffs that all persons having
any interest in the subject matter of the suit are parties
to the suit or are members of a class represented by
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parties to the suit. The same contention was ably
argued, carefully considered, and rejected in Martinez
v. Maverick County Water Control& Improvement District No. 1, 5 Cir., 1955, 219 F. 2d 666. There, as here,
a suit was brought for a declaratory judgment as to
water rights. There the plaintiffs asked for a decree reserving the right to plaintiffs to apply for injunctive relief. Here the plaintiffs pray for a declaration of their
rights and for an injunction. This difference does not
create a distinction. There it was said:
"The declaratory judgment would be binding only on
those parties actually before the court; each new party
asserting his rights in the waters of the river, in the
same or any other court, would have the right to relitigate the questions already adjudged as between those
before the court." Martinez v. Maverick County Water
Control and Improvement Dist. No. 1, 5 Cir., 1955, 219
F. 2d 666, 672.
On October 14, 1957, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in
that case. 355 U.S. 827,885.
A suit for adjudication of water rights within the generally
accepted meaning thereof and within the meaning of Section
666 is just what Senator McCarran described in his letter to
Senator Magnuson, included in Senate Report No. 755, and it
is what the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals described in Miller
v. Jenning s-a proceeding to determine the relative rights of all
users "on a given stream" or other source.
But plaintiffs sought only a determination that the United
States and its agents may not deliver to the defendant-type
water users of the Strawberry Valley Reclamation Project more
project water than the quantities specified in their respective
contracts with the United States. They did not ask a determination of the relative rights of the various water users on a
river syste1n or other source. They did not ask an adjudication
of water rights.
The United States is an appropriator of the waters of the
Spanish Fork River. So are the plaintiff canal companies.
But adjudication of those rights and the rights of other appropriators on the river is not the purpose of this suit, even if
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such were possible, contrary to the authorities above reviewed,
in the absence of all such appropriators. The individual water
users, plaintiff and defendant, and all other users whom they
are supposed to represent by this purported class action, are
not appropriators. 10 The project water supply, in which they
have contractual interests only and the use of which by defendant-type users is the sole subject of controversy, is, as
correctly noted by the Court below in paragraphs 2, 3, and 4
of the Decree, the property of the United States.
The Congressional consent to suits for adjudication cannot
be extended by implication to suits such as this. For "It is
not * * * [the court's] right to extend the waiver of sovereign immunity more broadly than has been directed by the
Congress." 11 Any contention that the statute should be liberally construed to permit this suit is clearly refuted by the
following language of the Supreme Court in its opinion in
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 703 (1949):
It is argued that the principle of sovereign immunity
is an archaic hangover not consonant with modern
morality and that it should therefore be limited wherever possible. There may be substance in such a viewpoint as applied to suits for damages. The Congress
has increasingly permitted such suits [for damages] to
be maintained against the sovereign and we should give
hospitable scope to that trend. But the reasoning is not
applicable to suits for specific relief. For, it is one
thing to provide a method by which a citizen may be
compensated for a wrong done to him by the Government. It is a far different matter to permit a court to
exercise its compulsive powers to restrain the Govern10
This is subject to the caveat that in this declaratory judgment action
there is no showing thaJt they are appropriators. In a suit for general
adjudication the truth of that matter could be determined. As all water
claimants must be joined under the statute before the United States can
be, supra, the error is here presented of joinder of the United States in a
type of action where, if the action is maintainable at al], joinder of other
appropriators is irrelevant.
11
United States v. Sha;w, 309 U.S. 495, 502 (1939). See also Belknap v.
Schild, 161 U.S. 10, 16 (1895) ; Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382
(1939).
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ment from acting, or to compel it to act. There ,are
the strongest reasons of public policy for the rule that
such relief cannot be had ag,ainst the sovereign. The
Government, as representative of the community as a
whole, cannot be stopped in its tracks by- any plaintiff
who presents a disputed question of property or contract rights. [Emphasis supplied.]
Enough has been said to demonstrate that this is not a suit
for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river
system or other source. Neither is it a suit for the administration of water rights within the meaning of 43 U.S.C. § 666.
In such suits courts can logically administer only between conflicting water rights inter sese. But such a suit certainly is
not maintainable for the internal management of one water
right [as the Government's, here] which is not alleged to be
adversely affecting others. Yet that constitutes the judgment
of the Court below as will appear more particularly in Part
III of this argument. No matter how the United States distributed its water, no injury could have been incurred therefrom by the other appropriators party to this suit (the canal
companies) as long as the United States did not trespass upon
their shares of the flow. There is no single allegation in the
petition that they were injured or apprehended injury-and
no evidence. 12
The statute can't be construed to authorize administration of
single rights only, while at the same time providing for nothing
less than systen1-wide adjudications. The contiguity of the
words of the statute prohibit. _.As the statutory consent is to
"the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system
or other source" and to "the ad1ninistration of such rights," it
can't be that suits for nd1ninistration are narrower in purview
than suits for adjudication. The statutory consent is not to
suits for the ad1ninistration of "any rights," or of a single
12
Why plaintiff canal compani~:-•:o: are even in the case is not clear to us.
They do not dnim 1that their rights have been infringed and they are
strangers to the contract:o: betwt'en the United States and the individual
water usPrs served by their systems. Their contracts with the United
States rPl•ate only to bh.e tl'ansportation of project water to the project
lands served by their respective systems (Fdgs. 25 and 26).
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right-it is to "suits for the administration of [rights to the use
of water of a river system or other source]."
We submit that 43 U.S.C. § 666 authorizes only suits for administration which are ancillary to suits for adjudication. Such
is clearly indicated by the following language from the legislative history. That language is also proof that joinder of all appropriators is no less necessary in suits for administration than
in suits for adjudication.
It is most clear that where water rights have been adjudicated by a court and its final decree entered, or where
such rights are in the course of adjudication by a court,
the court adjudicating or having adjudicated such rights
is the court possessing the jurisdiction to enter its orders
and decrees with respect thereto and thereafter to enforce the same by appropriate proceedings. In the
administration of and the adjudication of water rights
under State laws the State courts are vested with the
jurisdiction necessary for the proper and efficient disposition thereof, and by reason of the interlocking of
adjudicated rights on any stream system, any order
or action affecting one right affects all such rights.
Accordingly all water users on a stream, in practically
every case, are interested and necessary parties to any
court proceedings. [Emphasis supplied.] Senate Report No. 755, supra, footnote 9.
As Miller v. Jennings, supra, p. 17, is authority for the proposition that this is not a suit for adjudication of water rights
within the meaning of § 666, so also is it authority for the
proposition that this is not a suit for administration of such
rights. For if the suit there involved was not a suit for administration, neither is this. And while the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals did not expressly discuss in its opinion the language of
part (2) of the first sentence of the statute, the question was
before it and what it did say was applicable to that part as well
as to part (1). It was urged by appellants both to the Court of
Appeals and in their Petition to the Supreme Court for certiorari that the suit was one under the statute for the administration of water rights if not for adjudication.
There is a common thread running through suits for the adjudication and administration of water rights. This is that
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they are entertained by the courts to settle conflicts between
owners of rights to the use of water. This suit is not brought
for that purpose. The only appropriative rights really involved here are those of the United States. The gravamen of
plaintiffs' suit is not that the United States or any of the defendants are interfering with or impairing any of the plaintiff
canal companies' appropriative rights but that the individual
defendants are getting more of the reservoir supply of water
than they are entitled to. The waters impounded in the reservoir belong to the United States. No use made of them can interfere with the appropriative rights of the plaintiff canal companies who have no contracts with the United States relative to
reservoir water except that they will deliver it to their members.
The individual plaintiffs and the individual defendants have no
right to reservoir water except by contract with the United
States.
The whole subject matter of this case, and the only relief specifically prayed, is an interpretation of contracts made under
and in pursuance of the laws of the United States. The State
courts can hear suits brought under the statutory water laws for
adjudication or administration to resolve conflicts between appropriative rights and in some such suits it may be that the
United States can be joined. The State courts can hear suits
arising in contract between private citizens. But those courts
cannot, as a matter of jurisdiction, entertain suits of this nature
against the United States based purely and simply upon contracts with the United States.
Neither Section 666, 43 U.S.C., nor any other statute, wajves
the United States' imn1unity from suits such as this. As, further, there is no question but that this action is "a proceeding
against property in which the United States has an interest,"
Minnesota v. United States, supra, footnote 11, as inescapably
proved by the decree, it should have been disnll.ssed by the
Court below.
(b) Section 666, 43 U.S.C., does not consent that the wilJ of the Utah District
Court be substituted for that of the Secretary of the Interior, and his
authorized agents, who are charged by law with the administration of
the Strawberry Valley Roeclarnation Project. Were the statute to be so
construed, there would be serious doubt as to its constitutionality

As noted supra, p. 6, the decree entered herein purports to
enjoin the United States from interfering with the rights of the
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plaintiff canal companies to the natural flow of Spanish Fork
River. The granting of such relief by the trial court was purely
gratuitous since it was not sought by the petition or justified
on the basis of the issues which were tried. But aside from
that specific grant of injunctive relief, it is not questionable
that the purpose of the suit, even if limited to the relief specifically prayed by the petition, is to restrain and regulate administration of the project water supply by the Secretary of
the Interior and his authorized agents. The decree which has
been entered even more plainly attempts to accomplish such
purpose. The suit therefore should be considered as one for
specific relief in the effort to determine whether consent is
given by Section 666.
To test the accuracy of this analysis, it is necessary only to
consider the utter futility of a naked declaration upon the
specific questions referred to in the prayer if the Court were
not to undertake also to compel by its orders conformity to the
declarations it has made. And the fact that the test for determining the Court's jurisdiction in a suit for declaratory relief
is whether the controversy might be entertained in that Court
if the relief sought were injunctive (Colegrove et al. v. Green,
328 U.S. 549, 552 (1946)) indicates the judicial view that injunction is a concomitant of declaratory relief.
Apart from the express language of the statute and its legislative history, discussed supra, pp. 12 to 22, there are the
strongest reasons why § 666 is not to be construed .as authorizing the relief prayed for against the United States or that
granted by the decree which the Court entered. Those reasons
find expression in the authorities reviewed in part I.ll of this
argument respecting the constitutional incapacity of the judiciary to exercise legislative power and to control the executive
officers of the United States in the exercise of discretionary
powers validly conferred by statute. 13
13
It should be noted that we are not contending that the Secretary
of the Interior, or his agent, the Strawberry Valley Water Users' Association, may with impunity administer the project water supply in
disregard of the contracts which have been made with the project landowners. If, contrary to our contentions in part IV of this argument,
the practice of which plaintiffs complain does result in compensable
injury to the plaintiff-type users, then, as observed by the Supreme Court
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Thus, in Hudspeth County Conservation & Reclamation
District No.1 et al. v. Robbins (C.A. 5, 1954), 213 F. 2d 425,
432, cert. denied 348 U.S.. 833, the Court said:
* * * Whatever may be the merits of the plaintiffs'
contentions, the court would have no jurisdiction by
declaratory judgment, see Lynn v. United States, 5 Cir.,
110 F. 2d 586, 588, or by injunction against Government officers to substitute itself in any part of the
management .and operation of the dams, reservoirs and
facilities for the agency designated by Congress. * * *
In New Mexico v. Backer, 199 F. 2d 426, 428 (1952), the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals stated the problem in this
language:
The Rio Grande Reclamation Project was constructed
and operated in the exercise of a proper governmental
function and in accordance with valid statutes of the
United States. The facilities were owned by the United
States and the waters were stored in the reservoir to be
withdrawn by the United States for authorized governmental purposes. The management, control, and operation of such facilities are given the Secretary of the
Interior in broad terms, 43 U.S.C.A. § 373. The United
States could not hold or operate this vast project except
through its officials and agents. Backer was performing these functions for the Secretary of the Interior
and under his instructions. \Vhatever he did, he did
for the Secretary under authority of the reclamation
laws of the United States. The operation of the project
and facilities depended upon the flow of \Yater from
the reservoir. If this flow could be enjoined or affected
by court decree or order directed to Barker, he would
be under the direction of the court and not his supeof the United States in Iva.nJwe bTigafi.on District '· Mcf'racken, 357 U.S.
27!1, 297 ( 1958) "the courts are open for redress" in a suit for compensation. What we are contending is that Congress has vested the Secretary
of the Interior, and his authorized agents, with authority to administer
this reclamation projt>ct, including its water supply. and that Congress
has not consented ~to the assumption of !Such administration by the courts
of Utah or, for that matter, th.e courts of the United States.
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riors .as representatives of the United States. It would
be a complete ouster of the United States over the
control and management of its own property and
facilities.
And we repeat here the language of the Supreme Court
in the Larson case, hereinabove quoted at page 19:

* * * For, it is one thing to provide a method by
which a citizen may be compensated for a wrong done
to him by the Government. It is a far different matter
to permit a court to exercise its compulsive powers to
restrain the Government from acting, or to compel
it to act. There are the strongest reasons of public
policy for the rule that such relief cannot be had against
the sovereign. The Government, as representative of
the community as a whole, cannot be stopped in its
tracks by any plaintiff who presents a disputed question of property or contract rights. [Emphasis
supplied.]
Although in Belknap v. Schild, supra, p. 19, the Supreme
Court said "unless expressly permitted by act of Congress,
no injunction can be granted against the United States,"
it is of the utmost significance that neither in that case nor
in any other decision of an appellate court has it been found
that the Congress has extended such permission.
In the face of these precedents, it is inconceivable that
there can be found by implication 14 in a statute "not intended
to be used for any other purpose than to allow the United
States to be joined in a suit wherein it is necessary to adjudicate all of the rights of various owners on a given stream," 15
the consent by Congress that the Government can be stopped
in its tracks by any plaintiff who presents any disputed question of property or contract rights relating to the use of water.
14

"It [permission to sue the United States] will not be implied

* * *."

North Dakota-Montana Wheat Grower's Assn. v. United States (C.A. 8,
1933), 66 F. 2d 573, 577; cert. denied 291 U.S. 672 (1934).
15
The language immediately preceding that quoted from Senator McCarran's letter to Senator Magnuson is also especially significant: "S. 18
is not intended to be used for the purpose of obstructing the project of
which you ·speak or any similar project * * *." See Appendix hereto.
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The statute in express terms permits joinder of the United
States as a defendant only in suits for the adjudication of
rights to the use of water of a river system or other source,
or for the administration of such rights. There is no reference to actions such as this for injunctive or declaratory relife. That is in keeping with the view expressed by the Supreme Court in the Larson case that "There are the strongest
reasons of public policy for the rule that such [injunctive]
relief cannot be had against the sovereign." [Emphasis sup·
plied.] Since neither injunctive nor declaratory relief is expressly provided for, it necessarily follows that the Congress
has not waived the immunity of the united States from suits
of this character, for, as discussed above: "[The United
States] cannot be subjected to legal proceedings, at law or in
equity, without their consent; and whoever institutes such
proceedings must bring his case within the authority of some
act of Congress." 16
Were Section 666 to be construed otherwise, serious constitutional questions would be presented. Among them would
be the question whether Congress can constitutionally delegate
to the courts, either of the States or of the United States,
supervision of the performance by the executive branch of its
functions in the operation of a federal project. Since relief
is sought against the United States as well as against specified
officers, it must be assumed that judgment for the plaintiff
would of necessity, to be effective at all, be binding upon all
executive officers, including the President, and perhaps also
upon the Congress. The problem would be silnilar to those
dealt with by the Supren1e Court in Jfississippi v. Johnson,
71 U.S. 475 (1866), and by Judge Pope in his concurring opinion in United States v. United States District Court, infra,
pp. 31-32. Cf. Marbury v. i1ladison, infra, p. 41; Decatur
v. Paulding, infra, p. 41; .1llartin v. Jfotl, 25 U.S. 19, 31
(1827); Riverside Oil Co. v. Hitchcock, infra, p. 41; United
States v. Ide, infra, p. 42; 11 An1. Jur .. Const. Law, p. 889,
§ 190, footnote 1, p. 887, ~ 188. Congress may not ·waive the
sovereign immunity where the result would be to transfer to
the judiciary powers which under the Constitution repose in
16

Belknap

v. Sohild, 8Upra, p. 19.
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the executive branch of the Government. The doctrine of
separation of powers which precludes the legislative branch
from assuming to itself executive powers also forbids the transfer of such powers to the judiciary. (See infra, p. 42.)
We submit that neither the express language of the statute,
its legislative history, nor general policy considerations permit
an interpretation of § 6~66, 43 U.S.C., as authorizing this suit
against the United States.
II. The Court below had no jurisdiction over the Secretary of
the Interior and could acquire none. As the Secretary was,
however, an indispensable party, the entire action should
have been dismissed
Not much need be said in support of this point. The Secretary of the Interior has been given by Congress very broad
authority for the operation, management and control of federal reclamation projects, 43 U.S.C. § 373. By the decree of
the Court below, it is his hands which are tied, his congressionally delegated authority which is shackled. He is, therefore, an indispensable party. But he cannot be made a party.
This is because his official residence is the District of Colun1bia
and for that reason he is without the territorial jurisdiction of
any courts, State or Federal, except the courts of the District.
See Blackmar v. Guerre, 342 U.S. 512 (1951). Certainly the
Utah District Court was not capable of bringing him within
its jurisdiction by service of its process on him in \V ashington,
D.C.
Moreover, the trial court's judgment against him, even were
the United States not specifically named, would expend itself
on the United States and the United States' immunity from
suit is as much a bar to the suit against the Secretary as it is
to the suit against the United States. See Larson v. Domestic
& Foreign Corp., supra, p. 19; New Mexico v. Backer, supra,
p. 26; Hudspeth County Conservation & Reclamation District
No. 1 et al v. Robbins, supra, p. 24; Ogden River Water Users'
Assn. v. Weber Basin Water Conservancy District (C.A. 10,
1956), 238 F. 2d 936.
None of the contracts out of which this action stems seem
to have been made with the Commissioner of Reclamation.
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Moreover, his powers and authority are derived as a subordinate of the Secretary. If, because of these reasons, he is not
an indispensable party, nonetheless the District of Columbia
is his official residence and the service of process upon him
was also outside the jurisdiction of the lower court. Motion
made in the Court below to quash service of process upon
him should have been granted.
III. The decree entered is invalid for the following additional
reasons. It should be set aside and the Court below directed to dismiss the action

The third question presented by this appeal is: Did the
Court below have jurisdiction to render this particular decree?
We submit that it did not as a matter of constitutional law,
both Federal and, be it noted, of the State of Utah.
This portion of the argument would be no less valid even if
the Court below had secured jurisdiction of the United States
and of the Secretary of the Interior, which, of course, we absolutely deny.
We appeal from the whole of the decree) because the Court
had no jurisdiction to enter it as previously pointed out) and
also because no single paragraph thereof is responsive to the
pleadings and because judgment of dismissal is the only judgment on the merits which the record would support.
But especially we appeal from paragraphs 13 through 16 of
the decree, not only because they are even more strikingly unresponsive to the pleadings than is the rest of the decree-of
which the cross appeal of plaintiffs is eloquent proof-but because they are out-and-out regulation of a federal reclamation
project, and for that reason alone cannot stand.
There is nothing in 43 U.S.C. § 666 which remotely suggests
that Congress has authorized operation, management or regulation of a federal project by a State court.
That the Court below has attempted nothing less is apparent
from a consideration of paragraphs 13 through 16 of the decree.
In paragraph 13, "the Court has deemed it proper and necessary to make and does make the following provisions of the
manner in which the waters of the project shall be regulated
and distributed during the next ten years after the entry of
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this decree." [Emphasis supplied.] Following this in the same
paragraph are the detailed provisions providing, by regulating
the charge to be applied, how much of the United States' water
the project landowners may receive.
In paragraph 14 the State Engineer of Utah is designated as
"Referee," and his independent estimate of the amount of
water available to the project in any given year is binding
upon the Water Users' Association, the United States' managing .agent, as to what part of the Court's formula to apply.
Paragraph 15 provides that when the volume of river water
warrants, sales of excess project water may be made by theWater Users' Association at such rates as will not circumvent or
nullify the schedule of charges set forth in paragraph 13.
By paragraph 16, the Court retains jurisdiction of the cause
for ten years "for the sole purpose of making changes in the
percentages of charges to be made for the use of project river
water."
The argument below will show that in entering this decree
the trial court committed grave error.
(a) The Court below .has promulgated a legislative regulation for future
guidance. This is foreign to the judicial function and is forbidden by the
doctrine of separation of powers, which is binding as well upon the courts
of Utah as upon the Federal courts

In its most vulnerable aspect, the decree is legislative rulemaking quite outside the judicial function. Plaintiffs' pleading
is entitled "Petition for Declaratory Judgment," and the jurisdiction of the court is expressly invoked "pursuant to the
Declaratory Judgment Act of Utah, the same being Chapter
33 of Title 78, U.C.A., 1953." This is substantially the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act and provides. that the district
courts of Utah "shall have power to declare rights, status, and
other legal relations, whether or not further relief is or could
be claimed." It would seem hardly assailable that the setting
of an arbitrary charge in futuro for the use of water is not the
declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations. True
enough, in Utah as in other States other relief, including coercive relief, can be afforded in an action for a declaratory judgment, Gray v. Deja, 103 Utah 339, 135 P. 2d 251 (1943). But
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, it must, we think, be relief of .a type otherwise sanctioned in
law or equity, as damages, injunction, specific performance,
cancellation, rescission, reformation, etc. A rule setting an
arbitrary charge for future use of water is none of these. It
partakes of the legislative function which is, generally, "to govern future conduct," Mulcahey v. Public Service Commission,
101 Utah 245, 255, 117 P. 2d 298, 302 (1941). The following
cases demonstrate that such a rule is outside the judicial
function.
In Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. v. Denver & New Orleans R.R., 110 U.S. 667 (1883) Denver Railroad sought a court
order requiring Santa Fe to transact the business of through
traffic with it, the Santa Fe having previously refused to do so.
Denver contended that upon such refusal of Santa Fe to agree
"upon the terms of their intercourse a court of equity [could]
in the absence of statutory regulations, determine what the
terms should be." The Supreme Court said:
Such appears to have been the opinion of the Circuit
Court, and accordingly in its decree a compulsory business connection was ·established between the two companies, and rules were laid down for the government of
their conduct towards each other in this new relation.
In other words, the court has made an arrangement for
the business intercourse of these companies such as, in its
opinion, they ought in law to haYe made for theinselves."
In holding invalid the Circuit Court's order. the Supre1ne Court
said: "A court of chancery is not, any 1nore than is a court of
law, clothed with legislative power. It may enforce, in its own
appropriate way, the specific performance of an existing legal
obligation arising out of contract, law, or usage, but it cannot
create the obligation."
In Bistor v. Board of Assessors of Cook County, 346 Ill. 362,
179 N.E. 120, 78 A.L.R. 686 (1931), plaintiff taxpaJers complained that local taxing officials were not proceeding according
to law in assessing the value of real propert~T and sought a decree fron1 the court directing the n1anner in which the officials
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were to make the assessments. 17 The lower court refused to
provide any such direction and the Supreme Court of Illinois
affirmed the dismissal of the bill. The following language of
the Court points up the division between the judicial and the
legislative function:
It is long-established and well-recognized practice in
this state that a court of equity will exercise jurisdiction
to enjoin the collection of a tax where the tax is. not authorized by law, where it is assess.ed upon property not
subject to taxation, and where the property has been
fraudulently assessed at too high a rate. (Citations.)
This is not a case of that kind. The bill in this case
attacks the assessment because it is. alleged the assessing
officers have failed to follow the course imposed upon
them by law in making the assessment, and it is not a
bill which seeks to correct the wrong done to the complainants alone, but it seeks to have a court of equity
assume general supervision of the assessment and direct
in advance the officers charged with the duty of making
it, as to the manner in which they shall proceed.
The Court concluded that
The supervision of the officers appointed by law for
the assessment of property for taxation by directing
them in advance how they shall proceed is foreign to
the jurisdiction of equity.
In United States v. United States District Court, (C.A. 9',
19·53) 206 F. 2d 303, the United States sought a writ of prohibition against an order, issued pendente lite by the District
Court, commanding the release of certain waters from Friant
Dam for the benefit of downstream water users who had free
access to such waters prior to the construction of the dam.
The order attacked by the Government was characterized by
Judge Pope in the following language in a concurring opinion:
17
The case cited differs from this in that there plaintiffs sought the legislative relief which the lower court granted. In this case legislative relief
was not even sought by the plaintiffs.
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Here, the Court [i.e., the District Court], through its
agent, is about to tell the Bureau of Reclamation what
work is to be done on or near the pumps of the water
users. The Bureau may reduce the quantity of water
discharged downstream only if the Court's agent agrees
that the reduction will allow sufficient operation of the
pumps, and reduction below 400 second-feet may be
made only with the approval of the Court. The Bureau must do the work ori the water users' pumps as
the Court's agent may, in his opinion, think required.
In substance, the Court has undertaken to manage
and control the flow from Friant Dam, pendente lite,
through the Court's agent. (Ibid., 310.)
This order said Judge Pope, "amounted to putting the District Court in the water distributing business" (Ibid., 311).
And, ''However well adapted this order may have been to accomplish a common sense result, I do not see how power to
issue it could exist." And, "I think that the court is without
power to participate in such an enterprise" [i.e., the administration of water distribution even with the consent of all parties to the action]. The judicial, as opposed to the legislative,
function is illustrated by Judge Pope's following remarks criticizing the District Court's order:
Such a court may enjoin action where necessary to
preserve the status quo, but it may not create rights, nor
administratively execute them. Thus, while a district
court may enjoin the collection of a tax based on an arbitrary overvaluation of property. it may not determine
what tax would be valid, Rowley v. Chicaoo-o & N.W.
Ry., 293 U.S. 102, 112, 55 S. Ct. 55, 79 L. Ed. 222, it
may cancel a franchise to take water for breach thereof,
but not annul it under a power reserved in the grant,
Public Service Commission of Puerto Rico v. Havemeyer, 296 U.S. 506, 518. 56 S. Ct. 360, 80 L. Ed. 357,
it may set aside a confiscatory public utility r.ate but
not prescribe a valid one, Central Kentucky Natural
Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm., 290 U.S. 264,272,54 S. Ct.
154,78 L. Ed. 307.

*

*

*

*

*
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* ·»- * But it seems to me that a district court may not
assume the adminiskation here undertaken, any more
than such a court, while trying a suit to enjoin an adjoining landowner from excavating so as to cause subsidence of plaintiff's land and building, could appoint
an .agent to locate the place and to supervise the work
of making the excavation.
,~n addition to the United States Supreme Court cases cited
by Judge Pope, see the following: Honolulu Rapid Transit Co.
v. Hawaii, 211 U.S. 282 (1908), (courts have no business regulating the time schedule of street railway cars); Newton v.
Consolidated Gas Co., 285 U.S. 165 (1922), ("Rate making is
no function of the courts and should not be attempted either
directly or indirectly"); West Ohio Gas Co. v. Comm'n (No.
1), 294 U.S. 63, 74 (1935), ("A court passing upon a challenge
to the validity of statutory rates does not determine the rates
to be adopted as a substitute").
We are not unmindful, of course, that the federal courts
are constitutional courts and, because of the separation of
powers, without legislative power, Keller v. Potomac Electric
Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923). Even so, it does not seem to have
been that doctrine which decided the cases. above set forth.
The ratio decidendi of these cases seems rather, that rulemaking is "foreign to the jurisdiction of equity", Bistor case,
supra, p. 36. This limit on the judicial function, transgressed
here, is expressed by Justice Holmes in Prentis v. Atlantic
Coast Line Company, 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908): "A judicial
inquiry investigates, declares and. enforces liabilities as. they
stand on present or past facts and 'Uinder laws supposed already
to exist. That is its purpose and end. Leg,i8lation on the
other hand looks to the future and changes existing conditions
by making a new rule to be applied thereafter to all or some
part of those subject to its power. The establishment of a
rate is the making of a rule for the future, and therefore is
an act legislative and not judicial in kind ·* * *"
From this difference in the kind of function, as between
legislative and judicial, has come the cons:titutiona.l principle
of the separation of powers. Entirely aside from constitutional law, the cases above cited are authority for the proposiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tion that the Court below had no power as a court of equity
(and of course none at all as a court of law) to provide as
it did in its decree.
However, the decree of the Court below in this case also
violates the doctrine of separation of powers. That apparently
was the basis upon which the Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia set aside the decree of the trial court in Harrisonburg
v. Roller, 97 Va. 582, 34 S.E. 523 (1882) in the following
language:
The [trial] court, by its decree, not merely perpetually enjoined the town from performing the work in
the manner it proposed, but went even further and
fixed permanently 18 what the grade of the sidewalk
in front of the residence of the appellee should be,
and minutely prescribed the manner in which the town
should do the work. This was plainly beyond the jurisdiction and power of the court. The result of such interference by a court of equity would be to control
absolutely the council of a city or town in the exercise
of the legislative functions plainly conferred upon it
by the charter of the city or town, and to be exercised
by the council according to its discretion ; to usurp
powers expressly conferred upon the council; and to
substitute the discretion of the court in· the place of
that of the council.
The Constitution of Utah itself adopts the principle of the
separation of powers. 19 In Young , .. Salt Lake Cdy, 24 Utah
321, 67 Pac. 1066 (1902), this Court said that under tha.t constitution "powers belonging to one department of the government cannot be exercised by others. Courts cannot legislate
or make laws. This power is vested in the legislature and any
18

Emphasis in original.
Article Y of the Utah Constitution reads:
"The power of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into
three distinct departments, the Legislntiw. the Executiw. and the Judicial;
and no person charged with the exereise of powers properly belonging to one
of these (lppartment~. shall exercisE> any functions appertaining to either of
the others, except in the cases herein express!~· directed or permitted."
10
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law which confers such power upon a court or executive officer
is unconstitutional and void." 20
(b) The decree of the Court below directs the operation of a federal reclamation project. But the power of Congress over the operation of federal
reclamation projects derives from the Federal constitution and is exclusive of all State authority. Congress has not authorized the States or the
courts of the States to direct in any paricular the operation of these
projects

In a case decided as recently as June 23, 1958, 21 the Supreme
Court of the United States reaffirmed 22 the plenary power of
the Federal Government with respect to federal reclamation
projects. The Court said:
In developing these projects the United States is expending federal funds and acquiring federal property for
a valid public and national purpose, the promotion of
agriculture. This power flows not only from the General Welfare Clause of Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution,
but also from Art. IV, § 3, relating to the management
and disposal of federal property. * ·* *
* * * beyond challenge is the power of the Federal
Government to impose reasonable conditions on the
use of federal funds, federal property and federal
privileges. (Cits.). The lesson of these cases is. that
the Federal Government may establish and impose
reasonable conditions relevant to federal interest in the
20

This is the only Utah case discovered by us which is in point. In that
case a statute was attacked as unconstitutional because it conferred legislative powers upon the district courts of the state. The statute provided
that, upon petition filed by a majority of real property owners of land lying
within a city's limits praying that the land be disconnected from the city,
a district court could, if it found the allegations of the petition to be true
and if justice and equity required, issue a decree excluding the land from
the city limits. Denying the contention that the district court in issuing
such a decree was performing a legislative act, the Supreme Court said,
"It is a judicial act to determine what the facts in a given case are, and
whether such facts, when found, entitle the party to the relief sought." The
Court admitted, however, that "it is not without doubt and difficulty that
we have arrived at the conclusion" and cited decisions of other state courts

contra.
21
Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken, supra, p. 24.
22
See the earlier case of United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339
u.s. (1950) 738.
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project and to the overall objectives thereof. Conversely, a Btate cannot compel use of federal property
on terms other than those prescribed or authorized by
Congress." (357 U.S. at 294, 295).
[Emphasis
supplied.]
No federal statute authorizes the relief which plaintiffs sought
or the decree herein entered. On the contrary, the controlling
laws of the United States have vested in the Secretary of the
Interior all discretion to be exercised in the administration of
the Strawberry Valley Irrigation Project.
If the Court below, indeed, had power to enter the decree
which it made, then the management of every federal reclamation project could be taken over by a State court upon the
filing of a single petition by any water user holding a contract
with the United States for the delivery of project water. 23 It is
submitted that 43 U.S.C. § 666 could never have been intended
to bring about such a result. Supra, pp. 22 to 27.
Nor does Section 8 24 of the Reclamation Act authorize the
decree that was entered or the relief which was sought. That
law does not empower a State or the courts of a State to regulate in any way the operation of a federal reclamation
project. This is clear from the following language of therecent Ivanhoe decision, supra, p. 24:
As we read § 8 it merely requires the United States
to comply with state law when in the construction and
operation of a reclamation project, it becon1es necessary for it to acquire water rights or vested interests
23 This statement is in no sense hyperbole for the petition below did not
seek an adjudication of water rights. but only a declaratory judgment based
upon rights stemming from contract.
24
The Section in its codified form reads as follows :
"Vested rights and State laws unaffected by chapter. Nothing in this
chapter ~hall be construE><l ns affE>cting or intended to affect or to in any
way interfere with the laws of any State or Territory relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation, or any
vested right acquired then'under, and the Secretary of the Interior, in
carrying out the provi'sions of this chapter, shall proceed in conformity
with such laws, and. nothing herein shall in any way affect any right of
any State or of the Federal Government or of any landowner, appropriator,
or user of water in, to, or from any interstatE> stream or the waters thereof" 43 u.s.a. § 383
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3.7
therein. But the acquisition of water rights must not
be confused with the operation of federal projec.ts.
As the Court said in Nebraska v. Wyoming [325 U.S.
589] * * * at 615: "We do nut suggest that where
Congress has provided a system of regulation for federal projects it must. give way before an inconsistent
State system." * * * We read nothing in § 8 that compels the United States to deliver water on conditions
imposed by the State. (357 U.S. at 291, 292.)
The validity of this portion of the argument is even more
apparent if it be supposed that the lower court had acted or
been requested to act in pursuance of a Utah consti tu tiona!
or statutory provision presuming expressly to authorize intervention by the Utah court.sin the administration by the United
States· and its authorized agents of federal reclamation projects. The complete ineffectuality of such an attempt by a
State to regulate performance by the United Stakes of its constitutional functions is demonstrated by a long line of decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States ranging
from McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819) through
Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931), Federal Power
Commission V; Oregon, 349, U.S. 435 (1955), and Public Utilities Commission of California v. United States, 355 U.S. 534
(1958), to the Ivanhoe case, supra. And see infra, pp. 41 to
43. If the people of a state by constitutional or legislative
fiat cannot so limit or regulate the operations of the United
States, a fortiori the courts of a State cannot.
(c) The decree of the Cour.t below substitutes the will of the Court for
the will of the Secretary of the Interior, who is charged by law with
responsibility for the operation of federal reclamation projects. The
doctrine of separation of powers which precludes the court from promulgating a legislative regulation in the first place, also precludes it from
assuming direction of the executive function

The management, control and operation of federal reclama.
tion projects are the responsibility of the Secretary of the
Interior, 43 U.S.C. § 373. In the case of the Strawberry Valley Irrigation Project, the Strawberry Water Users' Association is his managing agent. The provisions of the contract
executed by the United States and the Association in 1940
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(Def. Ex. 49) not only show how close is his supervision of
the affairs of the Association but, more importantly, the great
extent to which control of the project is committed to his
own discretion.
As noted, supra, page 4, the 1940 contract requires the Association to operate the project, as well pursuant to the reclamation law and the regulations of the Secretary made thereunder,
as to its own terms (Article 14(b)). Many of these terms,
now to be noted, appeared in substantially the same form in
the 1926 con tract.
Article 14(c) provides that no substantial change in any
part of the project works shall be made by the Association
without written consent first obtained from the Secretary.
The Association must promptly make any and all repairs to
project works deemed necessary "in the opinion of the Secretary." Further, "If at any time, in the opinion of the
Secretary" any part of the project works shall be unfit for
service, he may order the water shut off until, "in his opinion",
such works are put in serviceable condition. In case of neglect or failure of the Association to make such repairs, the
United States may, "at the option of the Secretary", take
back the care, operation and maintenance of the project works,
or cause the repairs to be made and charge the cost thereof
to the Association, "which the latter agrees to pay."
Article 14(d), most important of all to the purposes of this
argument, deserves to he set out verbatim. It provides that
"The Association shall make proper distribution and delivery
of water to all parties entitled thereto in full accordance
with the provisions of their contracts now and hereafter made
and the reclamation law and the public notices and rules
and regulations issued by the Secretary thereunder." 2li
Article 14(£) provides that "The Association shall perform
and carry out in accordance with their true intent and 1neaning
211
It is to be empha~ized and reemphasized that by express provision of
many, if not all, of the watE>r right application contracts. determination
of the land owners' proportionate shares of "the water supply actually
available * * * during the irrigation season for the irrigation of lands
under" the various project units is to be made "by the Project Manager
or other proper officer of the United States, or its successor in the control
of the Project." Supra, pp. 3, 10.
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and to the satisfaction of the Secretary, all obligations imposed
upon the United States in all project contracts . . . and shall
not attempt in any manner to change any of the terms of any of
said contracts without the consent of the Secretary." No contract for the delivery of water made by the Association "shaH
be valid until approved by the Secretary, and a draft of each
such contract shall be submitted to the Secretary for approval
as to form before execution."
Article 14(g) provides that the Association shall: maintain
"a modern set of books of account, to be acceptable to the Secretary"; "furnish such financial reports and statements as ma.y
be required from time to time by the Secretary" ; furnish to
the Secretary each year "a reasonably accurate record of all crops
raised and agricultural or livestock product-s produced on the
project"; "keep for each year a careful and accurate record
of the project water supply and the disposition of the same and
furnish such detailed reports concerning the same as may be
required by the Secretary"; and "keep and report such other
records as the Secretary may require in the manner and form
prescribed by him."
Article 14 (h) provides that "The Secretary shall cause to
be made from time to time a reasonable inspection of the project to ascertain whether the terms of this con tract are being
faithfully executed by the Association." Such inspection extends to anything connected with the project and the costs of
it are to be borne by the Association even, be it noted, of inspection of documents relative to the project contained in the
files of the Bureau of Reclamation.
Article 17 requires the Association to employ a project manager, an irrigation engineer, a power superintendent (the project generates hydroelectric power), and an accountant. The
article provides that "The selection of each of said persons shall
be subject to the approval of the Secretary, and upon notice
from the Secretary that any of said employees is or has become unsatisfactory, the Association shall promptly, and as
often as such notice is given, terminate the employment of such
unsatisfactory employee and promptly employ one acceptable
to the Secretary."
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Article 18 provides that the Association may contract for
the sale, lease or rental of project wat-er for the purpose of
meeting its repayment obligations to the United States "subject to approval by the Secretary."
Article 19 (e) requires the Association to pay, inter alia, "direct costs for special work or services performed for the benefit
of the project by the United States at the direction of the
Secretary, and which in the opinion of the Secretary are for
the use and benefit of the project."
Article 21 provides that "all contracts for the sale or lease of
power or power privileges shall be upon terms and conditions
and at rates approved by the Secretary" and that "no additional capital investment in said power system shall be made
by the Association unless and until approved by the Secretary."
By Article 24 no transfer of water rights by the Association
shall be effective until the contract effecting it is "approved
in advance by the Secretary. The procedure to be followed in
making any such transfer, and the terms and conditions of
such transfer, shall be satisfactory to the Secretary."
Article 33 prohibits assignment of any part or interest in the
contract "until approved by the Secretary."
Article 34 provides that if the Association defaults in its
obligations "or is found by the Secretary to be operating the
project or any part thereof in violation of the provisions of
this contract, the United States may, at the election of the
Secretary take back" the operation of "all or any part of" the
project. "Notwithstanding any such resumption of operation
and maintenance by the United States, all or any part of the
property or works taken back by the United States may, at the
election of the Secretary, be re-transferred to the Association
* * *" During any time that the project works are being
operated by the United States pursuant to this article, the Association shall pay in advance operation and maintenance
costs "on the basis of estimates made by the Secretary and at
such times as the Secretary shall direct."
Finally, Article 35 provides that, in the event of disputes between the United States and the Associatjon as to questions
of fact arising out of the contract, the decision of the Secretary shall be conclusive and binding on the parties.
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- The many powers reserved to the Secretary by the con tract
and limited only by his discretion are specific instances of the
wide authority conferred on the Secretary by Congress. It
has been settled since the celebrated case of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, was decided in 1803, that courts will not attempt
to restrain the executive officers of the Government in the exercise of discretionary powers authorized by statute.26 In that
case Chief Justice Marshall said:
The province of the courts is, solely, to decide on the
rights of individuals, not to inquire how the executive,
or executive officers, perform duties in which they have
a discretion.
And see Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. 49'7 (1840). And
where an officer of the Land Department has authority to perform a discretionary act "the courts have no power whatever
under those circumstances to review his determination by mandamus or injunction," Riverside Oil Co. v. Hitchcock, 190 U.S.
316,325 (1902).
Under the applicable statutes and the contracts which
have been made, the matter of setting an equitable charge
for the use of project river water is a discretionary matter
for the Secretary. Further, even if it were not such per sewhich seems hardly tenable-any decision made in the matter
inescapably affects the Secretary's discretion in managing the
project water supply. If the setting of such charge were purely
a ministerial matter, the decree below could have assumed the
simple form of a direct command or mandatory injunction.
The fact that it does not but instead promulgates arbitrary
rates to be applied in futuro, and subject to change if experience proves them inequitable, is proof enough that the Court
below regarded this setting of a charge as a discretionary matter. It is therefore only properly for the Secretary's consideration.
In a case involving other management problems of a federal
reclamation project the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals re20

"It is a general rule that the courts are without power to interfere in the
performance of executive duties, particularly where the executive must exercise discretion in the performance of constitutional or statutory powers."
11 Am. Jur. 889, Const. Law, § 190, footnote 1; Ibid., p. 887, § 188.
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fused to attempt control of the Secretary's actions in the following language:
The necessity for drainage and the methods of conducting work are, in our opinion, in the sound discretion
of the Secretary of the Interior, and such discretion
cannot be reviewed by the courts. (United States v.
Ide, 227 Fed. 337, 382, affirmed 263 U.S. 497.) [Emphasis supplied.]
Without exception the other Federal appellate courts west
of the Mississippi have refused judicial control of the executive
in the administration of federal reclamation projects. See
Hudspeth County ConservaNon & Reclamation District No. 1
v. Robbins, supra, p. 24; New Mexico v. Backer, supra, p. 24;
Ogden River Water Users Association v. Weber Basin Water
Conservancy District, supra, p. 27; United States v. United
States District Court, supra, pages 31, 32.
It is no less the job of the Federal executive departments
to execute the Federal law than it is the job of Congress to
write it. The functions differ but the authority to perform
each is exclusive. The doctrine of separation of powers, which
precludes the legislative branch from assuming to itself executive powers, Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189
(1927), also forbids the transfer of such powers to the judiciary. In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat [14 U.S.] 304
(1816) Story says, "The second article declares that 'the executive power shall be vested in a president of the United
States of America'", and .asks, "Could Congress vest it in any
other person? * * * Such a construction," he says. "would
be utterly inadmissible." Op. cit.. 329, 330. As Marshall
had said earlier in Marbury v. 1lfadison, supra, page 41:
The province of the court is. solely, to decide on the
rights of individuals, not to inquire how the executive,
or executive officers, perform duties in which they have
a discretion. Questions * * • which are. by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive. can never
be made in this court.

*

*

*

*

*
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Where [as here] the head of a department acts in a
case, in which executive discretion is to be exercised;
in which he is the mere organ of executive will; it is
again repeated, that any application to a court to control, in any respect, his conduct would be rejected without hesitation.
No one would doubt that, if paragraph 13 of the decree
below had been drafted by Congress, it would have been an
exercise of legislative power or, if by the Secretary of the Interior, an exercise of executive power. But it is not, because
drafted by a court, the exercise of judicial power. Executive
power is executive power inherently and not because of the
source which attempts its exercise. It can be exercised neither
by the legislature nor the judiciary. An exercise of executive
power (as distinguished from the power itself) may be indistinguishable from an exercise of legislative power, as a regulation from a law. This is because both lay down rules of
conduct for the future. But in this respect both differ from
an exercise of judicial power which, as Marshall put it, is
"solely, to decide on the rights of individuals."
Granted that Congress has directed the Secretary of the
Interior "to comply with State law when, in the construction
and operation of a reclamation project, it becomes necessary"
to acquire water rights or vested interests therein ( 43 U.S.C.
§ 383, Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken, supra, p. 24;
United States v. Gerlach Livestock Co., supra, p. 35); and
has permitted rights so acquired to be determined along with
all other rights to the UJSe of water in a river system or other
source (43 U.S.C. § 666, supra, part I). But Cong,ress has
not provided that federal reclamation projects, or any part
or aspect thereof, shall be regulated in any degree by the
States or the courts of the States. As the Supreme Court of
the United States said in the I V'anhoe case, supra, p. 24, "the
acquisition of water rights must not be confused with the
,operation of federal projects."
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(d) The decree of the Court below makes new contracts for the parties.
No court has power to do this

In the preceding sections of this part of the argument, we
have demonstrated that the decree of the Court below transgresses established rules of public law. But it offends not
less an established principle of private law in this, that it
undertakes to make new contracts between the United States
and its water users. To do this is the prerogative of the
United States and its agents and the water users (infra, p.
49). It is not a judicial function.
We emphasize again the words of the Supreme Court of
the United States, quoted supra at page 30:
A court of chancery is not, any more than is a court
of law, clothed with legislative power. It may enforce,
in its own appropriate way the specific performance
of an existing legal obligation arising out of contracts,
law, or usage, but it cannot create the obligation.
(Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe R.R. v. Denver &
New Orleans R.R., 110 U.S. 667 (1883) ).
All of the parties to this action have contracts with the
United States with which the Court below could not interfere and to which it could not add. This is no more than
the general rule. "Interpretation of an agreement does not
include its modifications or the creation of a new or different
one. A court is not at liberty to revise an agreement while
professing to construe it. Nor does it have the right to make
a contract for the parties-that is, a contract different from
that actually entered into by the1n. Neither abstract justice
nor the rule of liberal construction justifies the creation of a
contract for the parties which they did not n1ake themselves
or the imposition upon one party to a contract of an obligation not assumed." (12 An1. Jur., Contracts, Sec. 228,
page 749).
If new rules are to govern the operation in any particular of the Strawberry Valley Irrigation Project. they n1ust
come fron1 "some source of legislative powern and not from
a court 1naking contracts for the parties. That is indeed indicated in the following language of the Supren1e Court of
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the United States, in The Express Cases, 117 U.S. 1, 28, 29
(1896), so relevant here that it is unnecessary to set forth
the facts of the cases it addressed:
The difficulty in the cases is apparent from the form
of the decrees. As express companies had always been
carried by railroad companies under special contracts,
which established the duty of the railroad company
upon the one side, and fixed the liability of the express company on the other, the court, in decreeing
the carriage, was substantially compelled to make for
the parties such a contract for the business as in its
opinion they ought to have made for themselves. Having found that the railroad company should furnish
the express company with facilities for business, it
had to define what those facilities must be, and it
did so by declaring that they should be furnished to
the same extent and upon the same trains that the
company accorded to itself or to any other company
engaged in conducting an express business on its line.
It then prescribed the time and manner of making the
payment for the facilities and how the payment should
be secured, as well as how it should be measured. Thus,
by the decrees, these railroad companies are compelled
to carry these express companies at these rates, and
on these terms, so long as they ask to be carried, no
matter what other express companies pay for the same
facilities or what such facilities may, for the time being,
be reasonably worth, unless the court sees fit, under
the power reserved for that purpose, on the application of either of the parties, to change the measure
of compensation. In this way as it seems to us, "the
court has made an arrangement for the business intercourse of these companies, such as, in its opinion, they
ought to have made for themselves," and that, we said
in Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad Co. v. Denver & New Orleans Railroad Co., 115 U.S. 587, could
not be done. The regulation of matters of this kind
is legislative in its character, not judicial. To what extent it must come, if it comes at all, from Congress, and
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to what extent it may come from the States, are questions we do not now undertake to decide; but that it
must come, when it comes, from some source of legislative power, we do not doubt.
IV. Plaintiffs failed to establish a cause of action against
defendants and even though jurisdiction of the United
States and the Secretary of the Interior were assumed, the
trial court should have entered judgment dismissing the
complaint

We have shown why the Court below was without jurisdiction to enter any decree in this case against the United States
and the Secretary of the Interior, both indispensable parties.
Alternatively, we have shown that even if jurisdiction of the
United States and the Secretary be assumed, the decree entered
is in excess of the power of the trial court. Finally, it is to be
noted that even had the trial court limited its decree to granting
the relief which the plaintiffs sought, such decree also would be
erroneous.2'l
What plaintiffs sought was a determination that by reason of
the several contracts between the Secretary of the Interior
and the water users of the Strawberry Valley Reclamation
Project the Secretary of the Interior, and his agent, the Strawberry Valley Water Users' Association, are precluded from delivering to the defendant-type water users more water from the
total project supply, including the Unit-ed St.ates' rights to the
use of the waters of the Spanish Fork River, than their respective water-right application contracts expressly specify. The
injury on which plaintiffs predicate their claim for such relief
is a claimed diminution of the project supply of stored water
as a result of the practice complained of to an extent greater
than would occur if the defendant-type users were held to the
27
In subdivisions (b) and (c) of Part III of the argument, we have noted
that granting of the relief which plaintiffs sought is as much precluded, by
the doctrine of separation of powers and the incapacity of the courts of a
State to regulate the performance by the United States of its constitutional
functions, ns is the legi'slative rule contained in the decree entered. And
see also subdivision (b) of P'art I of the argument. Part IY of the argument is addressed to additional considerations in support of the proposition
that the rPlief which plaintiffs expressly sought cannot be granted.
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quantities expressly stated in their contracts and their uses of
the project's supply of Spanish Fork River water were charged
in full against those quantities.
We submit that the evidence does not establish and the
Court below did not find that the practice complained of results in a diminution of the supply of stored water av.ailable
for satisfaction of the contract entitlements of the plaintifftype users. Certainly the statement in Finding 43 that "the
purchasers of water under the irrigation systems of the plaintiffs herein may have been deprived of their right to the use of
water to which they are entitled" is not .a determination that
plaintiffs have suffered or will suffer injury by that practice.
Neither is the statement in Finding 44 "That if [the defendant-type users] are not charged with at least some of the water
which they receive from the natural flow of Spanish Fork
River -x- * * such .Procedure will [in some years] result in
depriving the purchasers of water deliverable through the established irrigation systems of a part of the water right which
they have purchased." We submit that, on the contrary, the
trial court's determination that continuation of that practice
under the court's supervision is necessary in the interest of
conservation of the project supply refutes conclusively injury
to the plaintiffs as asserted by them. By its Finding 49 the
trial court specifically determined: "That, if water users are
charged for the full volume of water used from the river during
said season of high water they will probably use substantially
less of it, except in dry seasons, than if a smaller charge is
made for its use. That this would result in heavier demands
for stored water later in the season. A further result would
probably be that a portion of such high water would flow into
Utah Lake and be lost as project water." It was to provide
against such loss that the Court assumed to itself the responsibility of establishing a schedule of percentage charges for use
of the early water. 28
28
Why the trial court assumed that it can with greater wisdom than the
Secretary of the Interior and his authorized agent, or that it should attempt
to, administer, conserve and distribute the waters the rights to the use
of which belong to the United States for the use of this Federal project,
we are unable to understand. The purpose sought to be accomplished by
the decree is precisely the same as the purpose sought to be accomplished
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The factual question here is whether the plaintiffs have been
injured by the practice of which they complain. Does that
practice result in less stored water for the plaintiff-type users?
By its determination that the practice complained of should be
continued, but under the court's supervision, the trial court decided that that practice is less to the disadvantage of the
plaintiff-type users, and to the entire project, than would be a
practice of charging the defendant-type users against their
contract entitlements with their full uses of the early river
water.
Moreover, we submit, the execution of water-right application contracts such as those involved in the Strawberry Project do not enable the landowners of the project to police the
Secretary of the Interior in his exercise of the discretion with
which he has been invested by Congress in making contracts
with other project users or in administering the project water
supply to the best advantage of the entire project. The practice about which plaintiffs complain would not constitute an
invasion of any right of the plaintiffs even if the evidence
established that to some extent the total water supply available for delivery to plaintiffs is diminished thereby. Should
we be wrong in this assertion, however, the basic proposition
that the Secretary of the Interior and his agents cannot be
ousted from their administration of the project by grant of
the relief which plaintiffs seek is not altered. Supra, Parts
III (b) and III (c) of the argument. There can be no question
of due process for, as noted in footnote 13, supra, if plaintiffs
have suffered or should suffer any compensable injury, the
courts are open for redress in a suit for con1pensation.
by the practice of which complaint was made. We believe it is apparent
on the face of the matter that the Secretary of the Interior and the Water
Users' Association, authorized so to do by the laws of the United States,
are better qualified than any court to make those determinations which
necessarily must be made in administering a reclamation project water
supply to the greatest benefit obtainable for the entire project. We believe
further that the qualifications of the trial court to perform this function as
compared to those of the Secretary of the Interior are not strene<>i:hened by
the Court's designation as its agent for forecasting project supply the
State Engineer of Utah instead of the Secretary's agent. That the Court
is without power so to substitute its judgment in those matters for that of
the Secretary we have already demonstrated.
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It is further to be noted that there is nothing in any of the
contracts which plaintiffs sought to have construed which precludes the practice complained of. Certainly not in the contracts with the plaintiff-type users. And certainly not in the
contracts with the defendant-type users. Granted that the
Court below did find "That none of the applications contained
any provision for any user to receive water from the project
without being charged in full for the amount received" (Fdg.
45). But from this omission, it did not conclude that the contract provisions precluded the practice of making less than a
full charge to the defendant-type users for the early river
water used by them. On the contrary, it concluded "that the
charge to be made should be adequate to properly protect the
rights of other users under the project" (Conclusion 15). And
by adoption for purposes of its own administration of the project of the practice of making only a partial charge, it would
seem clear that the trial court did determine that there is
nothing in the provisions of any of the contracts with the
water users inconsistent with or which prohibit that practice.
But notwithstanding the terms of the water-right application contracts between the United States and the water users,
we know of no rule of law, statutory or otherwise, which prevents the Secretary of the Interior, by himself or through his
agent the Water Users' Association, from contracting separately from year to year with such of the project landowners
as may be willing to use the early river water for the use of a
portion of that water in addition to their right to receive stored
water later in the season. On the contrary, the physical situation existing with respect to the two components of the Strawberry Project water supply, as recognized by the trial court,
dictates that such be done in the interest of the fullest and most
beneficial use on the project of that supply. In effect, the practice of which plaintiffs complain amounts to the making of such
annual contracts.32
32
Of course, the problem which confronts the authorized agents of the
United States in their administration of the project water supply with respect to the defendant-type users does not exist with respect to the plaintiff-type users. They have no use for any part of the project supply of early
river water. They get all of such water as they want under the rights
thereto of the canal companies which serve them. Were they to utilize a
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Thus, without regard to the suability of the United States
and the Secretary of the Interior, the judgment of the trial
court should be reversed and the plaintiffs' complaint should
be dismissed for the additional reasons that (1) no right. of the
plaintiffs and the water users whom they purport to represent
which could be invaded by the practice complained of in administration of the project water supply has been established,
and (2) it has not been established that that practice in any
way injures the plaintiffs or prejudices the availability of the
project water available for satisfaction of their water-right application contracts. On the contrary, the trial court has determined that such practice tends to conserve, rather than
diminish, that supply.
CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted
that the decree of the Court below should be set aside and
the cause remanded to that Court with instructions to dismiss
the action.
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part of the project supply of river water, there is nothing to suggest that
the charge to them on account of such use would be any different from
that agreed to from year to year with the defendant-type users.
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APPENDIX
At footnote 9 and elsewhere in the foregoing brief, references
are made to the legislative history of Section 666, 43 U.S.C.
Additional excerpts from Senate Report No. 755, 82d Congress,
1st Seseion, which are particularly pertinent to the considerations presented, are as follows:
Pages 4 and 5:
It is most clear that where water rights have been
adjudicated by a court and its final decree entered, or
where such rights are in the course of adjudication by
a court, the court adjudicating or having adjudicated
such rights is the court possessing the jurisdiction to
enter its orders and decrees with respect thereto and
thereafter to enforce the same by appropriate proceedings. In the administration of and the adjudication of water rights under State laws the State courts
are vested with the jurisdiction necessary for the
proper and efficient disposition thereof, and by reason
of the interlocking of a;djudicated rights on any stream
system, any order or action affecting one right affects
all such rights. Accordingly all water users on a stream,
in practically every case, are in terested and necessary
parties to any court proceedings. It is apparent that
if any water user claiming to hold such right by reason
of the ownership thereof by the United States or any
of its departments is permitted to claim immunity
from suit in, or orders of, a State court, such claims
could materially interfere with the lawful and equitable
use of water for beneficial use by the other water users
who are amenable to and bound by the decrees and
orders of the State courts. Unless Congress has removed such immunity by statutory enactment, the bar
of immunity from suit still remains and any judgment
or decree of the State court is ineffective as to the water
right held by the United States. Congress has notremoved the bar of immunity even in its own courts in
(51)
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suits wherein water rights acquired under State law are
drawn in question. The bill (S. 18) was introduced for
the very purpose of correcting this situation and the
evils growing out of such immunity.
Page 6:
The committee is of the opinion that there is no
valid reason why the United States should not be required to join in a proceeding when it is a necessary
party and to be required to abide by the decisions of
the Court in the same manner as if it were a private
individual.
Senator Magnuson raised the question as to whether
S. 18 could be used for the purpose of delaying or
blocking a multiple-purpose development such as proposed for the Hells Canyon project on the Snake River
in the Columbia Basin or other similar projects, stating that there w.as a possibility of an individual or
group having water rights on that stream bringing suits
to adjudicate their respective rights and therefore preventing the Bureau of Reclamation from going ahead
with the Hells Canyon project while litigation is in
process or pending. The committee, for the legislative
history of this bill, definitely desires to repudiate any
such intent which may be deduced from S. 18 and states
that this is not the purpose and the intent of this legislation. ~There reclamation projects have been authorized for the benefit of the water users and the public
generally, they should proceed under the law as it exists
at the present time and should the Government have
reason to need the water of any particular user on a
stream, that water should be obtained by condemnation proceedings as is already provided for by law. The
committee can think of no particular reason why the
mere development of a project should be delayed or
stopped by the passa.ge of S. 18 and it is not so intended. An exchang:e of letters by Senator Maoonuson
and Senator McCarran dealing with this feature of the
bill is hereto attached and made a part of this report.
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Pages 9 and 10:
AuGUST

24, 1951.

Re 8. 18.
Hon. PAT McCARRAN,
Chair, Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate.
DEAR SENATOR: I am in agreement with the general
purposes of S. 18. However, there is one possible implication in the bill that has caused me some apprehension and I take this means of achieving clarification
before final action by our committee occurs.
It appears to me that section 1 of the bill-although
I am sure that is not the intent-might make it possible to block or delay a multiple-purpose development,
such as proposed for the Hells Canyon projeet on the
Snake River in the Columbia Basin.
I visualize the possibility of an individual or group,
having water rights on that stream, bringing suit to
adjudicate their respective rights-thereby preventing
the Bureau of Reclamation from going ahead with the
Hells Canyon project while litigation is in process or
pending. Such .action on the part of appropriators
might be taken on their own initiative or might be
stimulated by third parties who have been opposing this
development.
A similar set of circumstances might prevail with
respect to other streams in the Basin. I will appreciate
the benefit of your best judgment as to whether S. 18
could be used in the manner I have described. I think
clarification on this point will be extremely useful if
made .a part of the legislative history of this bill.

*

*

*

*

Sincerely,
WARREN

G.

MAGNUSON,

U.S.S.
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Hon. WARREN G. MAGNUSON,
United States Senate, Washington, D.C.
MY DEAR SENATOR MAGNUSON: I was very pleased
to receive your letter of August 24, 1951, relative to S.
18, which provides for the joining of the United States in
suits involving water rights where the United States
has acquired or is in the process of acquiring water rights
on a stream and is a necessary party to the suit.
I note that you raise the question that it might be
possible to block or delay a multiple-purpose development, such as proposed for the Hells Canyon project on
the Snake River in the Columbia Basin. You indicate
that you visualize the possibility of an individual or
group, having water rights on that stream, bringing suit
to adjudicate their respective rights thereby preventing
the Bureau of Reclamation from going ahead with the
Hells Canyon project while litigation is in process or
pending.
S. 18 is not intended to be used for the purpose of
obstructing the project of which you speak or any similar project and it is not intended to be used for any
other purpose than to allow the United States to be
joined in a suit wherein it is necessary to adjudicate all
of the rights of various owners on a given stream. This
is so because unless all of the parties owning or in the
process of acquiring water rights on a particular stream
can be joined as parties defendant, any subsequent decree would be of little value. I agree with you that for
purposes of legislative history, the report should show
that S. 18 is not intended to be used for the purpose of
obstructing or delaying Bureau of Reclamation projects
for the good of the public and water users by the method
of which you speak and in that··connection·· I propose
that such a statement be incorporated in the report and
that this exchange of letters be attached thereto.

*

*

*

*

*

Sincerely,
PAT McCARRAN, Chairman.
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1959
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